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ABSTRACT 
 
THE GILDED MASKS OF DIGITAL RHETORIC: SOCIAL AND PEDAGOGICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF EVOLVING PARALINGUISTIC ELEMENTS IN ONLINE 
COMPOSITION 
Emily Hart, MA 
Western Carolina University 
Director: Dr. Nathan Kreuter 
 
 Over the past few years it has become apparent to educators that the 
traditional focal points of composition are being necessarily shifted, outside of the 
classroom, because of the rhetorical spaces made available by the Internet. In 
the wake of the Web 2.0 revolution, when social networking and the production of 
web texts are flourishing, it’s more important than ever for educators to take note 
of the changes occurring in discursive habits and of the ability of students to 
respond to those changes in a way that will allow them to participate in and 
shape the dialogue. In undertaking a study of some of the most academically 
weak but rhetorically strong elements of online composition, emoticons, I argue 
that the use of these symbols as gestural representations are one indication of a 
collective attempt to remove composition from the institution of education. 
Furthermore, I believe that proficiency with content production and interpersonal 
communication on the web is a survival skill, emerging as a result of what 
economists and scholars call the “information economy,” and that using 
 
 
emoticons to augment linguistic communication is a subset of that development. 
As a result of the division between academic composition and web composition, 
the forms and styles of online writing are left to evolve unguided by education 
and have important implications, not just for pedagogy, but for the social 
constructs which govern the ways we use language to create and disseminate 
information. The manner in which educators succeed or fail to address changes 
in composition will have a direct bearing on how students identify themselves as 
writers, how they evaluate content, and with what authority they speak online. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Because the mask is your face, the face is a mask, so I’m thinking of the face as 
a mask because of the way I see faces is coming from an African vision of the 
mask which is the thing we carry around with us, it is our presentation, it’s our 
front, it’s our face. 
       —Faith Ringgold 
 
 About a year ago, I became intrigued by the strong resemblance borne by 
the emoticons of web composition to the gilded Dionysian masks used for 
Ancient Greek Theater and Japanese Noh Theater. The masks used in theatrical 
performances served several functions: not only did they help the audience to 
identify class and gender differences between actors, but they amplified the 
actor’s voice and served as a means to convey tone and feeling across the yards 
of space between the speaker and hearer. It occurred to me that the 
resemblance between emoticons and those theater masks extended beyond 
aesthetics and that there might be a rhetorical value to emoticons that hadn’t yet 
been fully explored. I wondered if there wasn’t something more to emoticon use 
than lazy text shortcuts and if they, in fact, possessed a capacity for pathetic 
appeal where textual language sometimes fell short of expressing sentiment. 
Maybe emoticons, I thought, have the ability to head off the misunderstanding 
that seems to be such a frequently occurring problem with interpersonal 
communication online.  
 This revelation came on the heels of two weeks spent intimately with a 
book by Jaron Lanier, called You are not a Gadget, in which he expressed 
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concern about how a user’s identity and authority are affected, not just by the 
anonymity of online composition and communication, but by the 
phenomenological swell of “crowd wisdom” made possible by the digital 
collectivism inherent to the Web (138-42). His primary concern, which became 
mine as well, was that the most accessible content on the Internet is not 
necessarily the most credible and, as a result of that, people must be able to 
approach web content more critically than the peer-reviewed content they 
traditionally access in an educational institution. The language that evolves out of 
online communication, including emoticons and, similarly, texting language 
(acronyms like LOL or “actorisks” like *squeals*), appears to reflect Lanier’s 
concern that full inclusion in the dialogue is, in fact, reducing the conversation to 
the lowest common denominator (55-57).  
 The problem I saw in reconciling these two things—the rhetorical value of 
online linguistics with their potential to diminish the dialogue to “average”—was 
that educators weren’t paying the right kind of attention to composition outside of 
the classroom. Richard Webster writes, “Never have so many typed with so little 
regard to their messages, content, and intentions.” As I’ll discuss in Chapter 2, 
Webster, a specialist in Online Education and Instructional Technology, is not 
alone in his perception of much web composition as thoughtless, reductive, or 
downright frightening. Many educators are quick to condemn the language of 
technology as scary or boring, marginalizing it to make room for the print texts of 
tradition. Their aversion isn’t altogether unwarranted.  
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In 2008, a PEW Internet study on teens and writing reported that 40 
percent of teenagers have used texting language in their academic writing and 
that more than 60 percent intentionally mispunctuate or use informal text in their 
school assignments (Smith “Grammar in the Digital Age”).  One in four of those 
studied admitted to having used emoticons in their academic writing. Instances 
like these are reasonably infuriating to educators, whose instinct may be to 
censure or even rail against what research analyst Amanda Lenhart calls a “new 
hieroglyphics” of online linguistics. However, because, as I will detail further in 
Chapter 2, online composition is quickly becoming the preferred means of 
communication for most Americans, banning these elements from academic 
writing without further attention can’t be the answer to the problem of a reduced 
dialogue, unless educators want to push composition out of the academy and 
deeper into the electronic environment toward which, as will be discussed further 
in the following chapter, it already appears to be migrating. Rather, a better 
solution is for academics to take a closer look at the elements of online 
composition and attempt to identify the social contracts that bore them in order to 
adjust their pedagogy accordingly.  
Laura Gurak describes the aim of this academic attention to technology 
and composition as “cyberliteracy.”  Cyberliteracy entails much more than 
mastery of computer skills. This particular literacy requires an understanding of 
the implications of Computer mediated communication (CMC) for social/cultural 
relationships.  By 2012, people have become so inundated with electronic 
communication that they may not necessarily be conscious of the processes that 
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they go through in communicating online or be aware of how that technology and 
those processes affect them. The presence of those technologies, though, is so 
strong that it’s nearly impossible for the daily barrage of data, and the interfaces 
through which they’re disseminated and parsed, not to inform attitudes and 
behaviors. Like Lanier, Gurak’s cyberliteracy attempts to prepare students for 
critical evaluation of content and to impart, to them, the wherewithal to 
understand the real implications of the language they use in online writing. My 
addition to this theory is that it should call for instruction in determining what 
linguistic and paralinguistic elements are appropriate for various rhetorical 
situations.  
My initial instinct—that there is a deeper discursive value in the seemingly 
immature implementation of emoticons and texting language—is rooted in a firm 
belief that delivery and style are as important to a rhetorical situation as 
invention. As I’ll be discussing in the next chapter, those particular linguistic 
elements are a means of deploying gesture in a rhetorical space where there are 
no physical bodies present, which affords them a prominent location in online 
delivery. Since emoticons will be my vehicle into many of these larger social and 
academic issues—the relationships between online composition, delivery, and 
the academy—I’ll begin this study with a short exploration of the function of 
emoticons and texting language as surrogate gestures, looking specifically at 
their connection to the changing role of delivery in composition studies.  
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CHAPTER ONE: CYBERLITERACY AND PARALINGUISTIC CUES IN ONLINE 
COMPOSITON  
 
It’s a rather rude gesture, but at least it’s clear what you mean. 
       —Katharine Hepburn 
 
At the center of Gurak’s “cyberliteracy” is a theory about electronic 
communication, developed by Walter Ong, called “second orality.” Second 
orality, simply put, is the idea that Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) is 
a new medium between written and spoken language, which contains elements 
of conversation. It’s helpful to see the special literacy of CMC as a midway point 
between print and oral literacy. Like oral speech, Ong says, electronic 
communication is “aggregative,” “empathetic and participatory,” “redundant,” and 
“situational” (qtd. in Gurak 14). He notes that it is “additive rather than 
subordinative,” taking on form and style as sentences are built on top of and in 
response to one another (Ong 36-37). Like oral conversation, electronic 
composition and communication are more casual, more fluid, and more 
immediate than print. As Ong puts it, this type of communication is “close to the 
human life world” (42, 80). At a glance, this theory appears to be stating the 
obvious but, according to Ong and Gurak, it’s important to give attention to the 
conversational nature of online composition in order to see how drastically it 
differs from either of its contributing literacies.  
Computers—like the stone and paper record keeping devices before 
them—speed up the travel of information (Gurak 17, 30-31), thus shortening, 
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even more, the informational thoroughfare between two communicating bodies. If 
word-of-mouth were comparable to walking, letter-writing to bicycling, and news 
printing and television to automobile travel, then electronic communication would 
be comparable only to things found in science fiction: warp speed space ship 
travel, deploying one’s own apparition, or having Scotty beam us up. The most 
commonly used interfaces—email hosts, social networking sites or chatting 
programs—are designed for quick communication. Those interfaces function on 
immediacy. They work quickly and encourage the user to keep pace. A person 
chatting, for instance, doesn’t necessarily have the luxury of sitting down for a 
few hours to scribble and erase, write and edit, until they have a polished product 
because electronic communication often requires more prompt attention, 
rendering the dialogue conversational.  Importantly, neither are those interfaces 
intended for those slower composing processes. Furthermore, many users are 
carrying out several different processes simultaneously during their online time. A 
2004 PEW Internet study reports that, of the 53 million Americans using Instant 
Messaging (IM), 61% are doing something else on their computer at least some 
of the time while IMing and 32% of those say they multi-task every time they’re 
using IM (Lenhart “How Americans”).  The speed of online composition, though a 
far cry from the composing process many educators encountered in their own 
schooling experiences, is supportive of the pedagogical theories currently 
informing teaching practice.   
According to Ann E. Berthoff, in “Recognition, Representation, and 
Revision,” the only way to make sense of the mechanical processes of writing—
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thinking about what to say, removing unnecessary words, making sure that each 
sentence relates to the thesis—is to wallow in the actual experience of writing, 
rather than focusing on the end goal (546). A unique benefit of composition in the 
electronic environment is that it allows the writer to attend primarily to his 
experience with the writing, rather than to the correctness of the language in 
pursuit of the “right” usage. Within many of the electronic interfaces of the Web, 
composition is not linear, but happens all at once, and the rules-oriented 
systematization of current-traditional rhetoric and process pedagogy is all but 
nullified by the attention of users to immediacy and their subsequent creation of 
new social contracts governing language.  
 What is so different about online composition that makes it so appealing 
and widely adopted to this generation? One of the key differences between 
academic writing and online writing, is that, operating in the conversational 
context of second orality, online writing incorporates into its language a system of 
hieroglyphs (emoticons) and text shortcuts (acronyms and “actorisking”) to 
indicate gesture. Lenhart, Lewis and Rainie, in PEW Internet and American Life 
Project’s 2008 report, “Teenage Life Online: The Rise of Instant-Message 
Generation and the Internet’s Impact on Friendships and Family Relationships,” 
identifies these linguistic elements by their functions in text-interpretation and 
augmentation: 
Among the many striking things about teen’s [sic] use of the 
Internet is the way they have adapted instant messaging 
technologies to their own purposes. The majority of teenagers have 
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embraced instant messaging in a way that adults have not, and 
many use it as a way to conduct [the] most mundane as well as the 
most emotionally fraught and important conversations of their daily 
lives. They have invented a new hieroglyphics of emoticons to add 
context and meaning to their messages and a growing list of 
abbreviations to help them speed their way through multiple, 
simultaneous online conversations. (10) 
Sprouting from the intersection of Ong’s “second orality” and Berthoff’s 
“allatonceness,” it seems like Web composition and the demand for cyberliteracy 
would have received more attentive efforts from the academic community. While, 
as will become more apparent in the next chapter, academic attention isn’t 
fixated on these particular rhetorical situations or devices, there has been a 
resurgence, over the last decade, of academic attention to the gestures that 
those devices intend to mimic.  
Adam Kendon suggests that one of the reasons that there is such an 
interest is that, beginning in the eighteenth century, scholarship opened up the 
possibility that language was initially predicated on gesture. Spoken language, 
some scholars argue, could have leaned primarily on gesture, even wholly 
consisted of it (7). If, like Lenhart, Lewis, and Rainie suppose, society is in the 
process of forming a new language around Internet communications, and that 
language is propped up by gestural elements, then emoticons and texting 
language could be the underpinnings for important changes in the way we 
communicate.  
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Kendon, in Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance describes how language 
and gesture can be seen as components of the same process. Those 
components, each necessary to the functionality of the other, are used in 
accordance toward the enhancement of understanding (3).  How naturally—that 
is, how subconsciously—gestures are performed during a communication varies 
with each rhetorical situation.  Gesture is often manifested in body language, 
something that is typically thought to be unconscious or unintentional. Kendon 
describes how gestures, in this context, offer nonverbal clues about ethos: 
[W]henever people are co-present to one another they cannot avoid 
providing information to one another about their intentions and 
involvements, about their status as social beings and about their 
own individual character, and so may be said to ‘give off’ 
information, people often engage in action that is regarded as 
explicitly designed for the provision of information and for which 
they are normally held responsible. (7) 
The deployment of gesture through the use of emoticons and texting 
language is almost invariably more deliberate than many of the gestures involved 
in a face-to-face interaction, but the ethical cues are not diminished by that 
intention. In using an emoticon, for instance, a person has to make the conscious 
decision to display facial expression to his audience, so there is intention, though 
the intention may be to add an element of artificial spontaneity or naturalness, 
thus enhancing ethos.  Kendon uses a bit of history to stress the importance of 
spontaneously appearing gesture to rhetorical savvy. Ancient Greeks and 
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Romans, he says, thought gesture was a pathetically powerful tool that the rhetor 
had to refine in order to best persuade (17). Aristotle, who accused gesture of 
clouding “real” meaning, was countered by Cicero’s assertion that gesture is 
important to communicating the underlying sentiment of the message, though it 
should be polished in a very different way than theatrical gesture. It should not, 
he says, replace words but supplement them and should be contained within the 
thought to which they relate without extending beyond it (19). In the context of 
cyberliteracy, these restrictions may mean that if, for example, a smiley face isn’t 
well placed, if it comes after the whole paragraph instead of just after the piece of 
language it’s intended to modify, it becomes ineffective.  
 Perhaps the most oft-visited classical authority on gesture is Quintilian 
who, in Institutio Oratoria, describes how voice and movement are two equally 
important components of delivery, though gesture plays a supportive role to 
voice. In online composition, the gestural elements of emoticons, acronyms and 
actorisks (asterisk-bookended gestures, like *shrugs*) may have to account for 
both. “Gestus” refers not only to body movements, but to the nuances of the face. 
The “glance” is the most essential of the gestures, drawing meaning with the 
eyebrows and, according to Quintilian, the nostrils. He distinguishes between 
“natural gestures” and gestures that are designed to “show” an imaginary object, 
only crediting the former with importance to oratory (Kendon 19). These “natural” 
gestures “should be adapted rather to [the orator’s] thought than to his actual 
words” (Quintilian XI: 89) and should avoid looking contrived, giving the illusion of 
spontaneity.  
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 Though the obvious and unavoidable intentionality of gesture deployed in 
online composition may appear to push back against the desirable quality of 
spontaneity, it doesn’t fit as awkwardly into Quintilian’s model as one might think. 
Here’s an example: my friend, Maloree, has a habit of guilt-tripping me into 
adhering strictly to a schedule of Tuesday night dates by replacing “are we 
hanging out tonight?” with the infinitely more loaded “are we going to be friends 
tonight?” Her emotional coercion is blatant—we can smell our own—and my 
impulse is to greet it with sarcasm. Occasionally, when I try to dodge the 
discomfort—as is my custom—of saying “no,” I’ll respond with “We’re friends? ” 
or something like it, always augmented with a smiley face, pointedly offering the 
illusion of spontaneous body language. If I were speaking to her in my living 
room, the immediacy of an actual smile would hopefully take the sting out of the 
rejection. However, without the presence of two physical bodies, if I want the 
same kind of reaction, I deliberately account for that facial expression by using 
an emoticon.  
One of the things I’ve tried to demonstrate, in my communication with 
Maloree, is the “natural” dual occurrence of two things that do not appear 
naturally connected: negative speech and positive body language—what adds up 
to something like sarcasm, joking, or well-meant criticism. To repurpose 
Berthoff’s phrase, I have captured the “allatonceness” of my rhetorical situation. 
Through this use of a “smiley face,” which provides the illusion of spontaneous 
body language, I have conveyed an entirely different meaning than if I had 
written something like “We’re friends? I’m smiling as I write that,” which would 
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likely be perceived as contrived or insincere. Certainly my meaning is different 
than if I forewent any indication of lighthearted gesture at all—an unfortunate 
mistake that would land me, at best, in the dog house for a couple of days and, at 
worst, without a date for next Tuesday night.  
 The same presence of intention can be assumed of most instances of 
emoticon or texting language usage, since it’s unlikely that someone would 
subconsciously use an emoticon or accidentally type “LOL.” Physical gestures—
that is, gestures made in face-to-face interactions—aren’t governed by the same 
rigid, sequential code as either written or spoken language, which tends to 
require more conscientiousness as they’re deployed (Kendon 2-3). Online, 
though gesture is more intentional, the social contract under which it operates 
allows it to act as a spontaneous, organically occurring thing. So, for the 
purposes of this exploration, though they require more intention than physical 
gestures, instances of electronic gesture will be regarded as functioning in the 
same capacity as the “spontaneous” body language of face-to-face 
communication. Whether these gestural simulacra are used in contrast to or in 
union with speech will vary with each use.  
 Where supplementing textual language with electronic gestures has the 
potential to reduce misunderstanding, the use of the wrong gesture in online 
communication has the capacity to amplify the misunderstanding that’s already 
such a risk in the electronic environment. Using emoticons effectively is not as 
easy as it may seem and Gurak’s cyberliteracy may not be particularly natural for 
a speaker to achieve proficiency in, even if the “gesture” is contained within the 
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thought. It’s too simple to assume that, as long as an emoticon doesn’t stand 
alone, as long as it is qualified with a statement, it serves a rhetorically effective 
function as gesture. A poorly placed emoticon can create such ambiguity as to 
completely lose an audience. Comedian Mitch Marzoni offers an example: 
I was talking to a friend via text the other day and she was having 
boy problems. I offered an ear (err, eye, as the case may be) and 
small bits of advice […] and at the end, she thanked me for 
listening […] and I said “Hey, I’m here to help ;).” I put the “;)” in 
bold so it would be obvious. That’s a wink. Not a smile. I meant to 
smile. As in “Hey! Be happy,” but instead…a wink. Which says “I’m 
here to help…(or failing to do that, to grope you inappropriately).”  
If gestures are best intended to represent the thought process that isn’t being 
represented by the actual language (Quintilian XI: 89), and the gesture used 
alongside the language seems to contradict that language, then the resulting 
ambiguity can be disturbingly confusing: Marzoni’s supportive “I’m here to help,” 
in combination with a suggestive winky face creates a seemingly predatory 
rhetorical situation.  
 Failures like Marzoni’s can be humorous, but other erroneous uses or 
misplacements of emoticons can have more damaging impacts. Certainly, a part 
of “cyberliteracy” is being able to identify the proper environments for gestural 
simulacra. It would not be appropriate to use an emoticon, which is intended to 
establish an attitude or emotion, in a professional, pure-data-based scenario. In 
fact, emoticon usage has become a quick screening process for disqualifying 
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applications (Walia) and is understandably unwelcome in an academic setting 
where educators who grew up without the presence of emoticons in composition 
are struggling to simply figure out what to do with those newer linguistic 
elements.  
It seems unusual that, in the electronic environment, where physical 
bodies aren’t observably present, gesture would have such a central role in the 
communication process. Yet, the lingua franca of the Internet inarguably 
embraces gesture symbols like emoticons and acronyms. But why? One reason 
may be that, as Kendon posits, gesture has been tossed around by scholarship 
as the discursive element with the least regional restrictions and variation. “There 
are grounds,” says Kendon, “[for] thinking there are aspects of gestural 
communication that are universal” (327). Though cultures vary to some degree in 
their use of gesture, many of those variances are likely due to the differences 
between the linguistics on which they’re based (Kendon 326-48); but many 
gestures, “natural gestures” like the facial expression denoted by an emoticon or 
the gesticulation symbols of an actorisk are more “universal” (327). 
A more biased speculation as to why gesture symbols have such a 
prominent role in online composition is that, with scholarly focus on invention and 
arrangement, writers left to tinker, unguided, with the idea of delivery have now 
had enough time to create their own theory and practice of delivery, though they 
may be unaware of it. It’s possible that—since delivery is often either separated 
from invention by the division of Communications and English courses or 
marginalized by the greater attention of these courses to language—society has 
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naturally found a way to reconcile delivery with the other four canons by re-
marrying gesture to language. If that is true, then the fact that the Internet is the 
yet uncultivated sanctuary where this marriage took place has important 
implications for composition instruction and the institution of education. Assuming 
that educators don’t address this need for examining language and gesture in 
tandem, they run the risk of driving composition further from the classroom and 
deeper into the wilds of the Internet, where the proverbial People seem to be 
turning for new authority.  
In order to best adapt to social demands, composition studies should be 
asking what exactly this new literacy is, how it functions to create social 
relationships, what it says about changing values, and how it can best be used to 
help students refine the rhetorical skills that will empower them. For that 
exploration to occur, the second orality of online composition must be examined 
to see where the components of print literacy and oral literacy intersect and 
where they diverge—logically, beginning with the gesture (and, by proxy, the 
reverence for delivery) represented by emoticons and texting language.  
  
16 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LIBERATING COMPOSITION 
 
Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember sometimes that 
nothing worth knowing can be taught. 
 
       —Oscar Wilde 
 
 
A benefit of face-to-face communication is that physical cues, particularly 
when used in tandem with verbal language, add meaning to the messages 
people convey. Body language allows people to read between the proverbial 
lines; a speaker’s control over those nonverbal signals has tremendous potential 
to act as the effective mortar that glues together any structurally sound 
communication. While the psychological processes behind an emotion are not 
observable to an audience, studies of facial expression within psychology 
contend that the face is the most authoritative physical indicator of those 
processes (Carerra, Casado, and Fernandez-Dolz 122-24).  While words aren’t 
always as transparent as we’d like, the expression on a speaker’s face—the 
movements of their eyebrows, lips and eyes, within or between their verbal 
cues—tends to reveal  sentiment, even  belie sentiment, especially where it 
contradicts spoken words. The act of processing these facial expressions affords 
the listener a sort of communicative metal-detector that allows him access to 
information below the surface, particularly when (as is often the case) the 
expressions are not consciously made by the speaker. As a tool for the speaker, 
intentional facial expressions can act as pathetic appeals, giving the listener a 
controlled glimpse into the emotions behind the speech. That rhetorical move is 
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particularly valuable because, since so many facial expressions are 
unintentional, the listener may be inclined to assume that the expressions 
deliberately made are actually unintentional and therefore more legitimate.  
“Each basic emotion is a coherent pattern of facial behavior, experience, 
physiology and instrumental actions” (125). If the facial patterns which are 
inherent to emotion make the listener feel a certain way, the speaker has 
succeeded in making a pathetic appeal. If those facial expressions are received 
by a listener as unintentional and the pathetic appeal has already been made, 
then the speaker has succeeded in further building his ethos.  
Andersen cites Psychologist Albert Mehrabian’s suggestion that no more 
than seven percent of communication occurs through the words people use. 
Rather, the bulk of any particular message is received through the paralinguistic 
cues—body language and tone of voice—observed of the speaker by the listener 
(43). Within this theory, communicative “tells” like physical gestures and the 
sound of the speaker’s voice become rhetorical must-haves. If Mehrabian is 
correct and 93 percent of communication takes place somewhere between the 
words, then what is to be done with a medium like the Internet that seems to 
hinge entirely on written word? If facial expressions, body language, and tone 
account for so much of a rhetorical appeal, how can they be reborn into an 
electronic environment? 
It would be difficult to argue that social presence is not somehow affected 
by the insertion of a machine between two communicating bodies. However, 
whether these nonverbal cues are diminished by an electronic medium is 
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debatable. In Computer Mediated Communication (CMC), things—like  physical 
space, bodily gestures, and underlying sentiment (like sarcasm)—that are 
conveyed through tone tend to be marginalized by an environment that privileges 
written language over spoken language.  D’Addario and Walthers quote Godin, 
who describes the failure of CMC, pre-emoticon, to convey the subtleties of 
conversation: “until the advent of the smiley, otherwise known as the emoticon, 
individuals using electronic communication had no way to indicate the subtle 
mood changes. They couldn’t tell jokes, use irony, slip in a pun or become 
bitingly sarcastic” (326). Godin’s supposition is certainly a big generalization but 
he’s correct in noting that many of the nuances of verbal communication are 
easily lost in an electronic environment, nonetheless. 
Delivery concerns itself with the extralingual elements of communication 
described by Mehrabian, Carerra et al., and D’Addario et al.—particularly with 
gesture (Sonkowsky 256-57). That particular canon, unlike its more popular 
cousin invention, deals in how something is said, rather than what is said and it 
does this by employing the rhetorical appeal of pathos since, as Sonkowsky 
points out, “Aristotle fixed delivery as an aspect of rhetoric which is directly linked 
to emotions” (266).  
Emoticons, in mimicking facial expression, act as gestures in online 
communication, as do texting language by mimicking physical body language 
and, often times, tone. Therefore their function is most appropriately located in 
the rhetorical canon of delivery as rhetorical tools for pathetic appeal. The 
integration of emoticons, along with other gesture signifiers, is a needed step in 
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the evolution of writing: within the anonymity of the electronic environment, 
emoticons may be a remedy to ensuing misunderstanding (Fogg 7-9). The kinds 
of expression represented by these gestural representations primarily reflect the 
kinds of instantaneous, seemingly organic facial expressions that Quintilian 
suggested should be “adapted to [a speaker’s] thought” (XI: 89).  Like gesture, 
the rhetorical worth of emoticons is primarily pathetic. These symbols modify 
written language by demonstrating emotion, physical movement or contact, and 
tone, allowing the reader to garner a deeper understanding of the sentiment 
behind a message. The ability of emoticons to ameliorate ambiguously written 
language is particularly valuable in places, like CMC, where social presence is 
diminished or elbowed out entirely.  By mimicking facial expression, users can 
clarify intention without bumbling around, attempting to qualify their written 
language with more written language. If Ong’s “second orality,” as we saw in the 
previous chapter, dominates the electronic environment, combining the most 
distinctive characteristics of oral literacy with those of print literacy, then 
emoticons and texting language seem to be the poster children for Team Orality. 
Unfortunately, though, if these symbols have arisen naturally to meet the needs 
of “cyberliteracy,” they may have done so without instruction or even involvement 
from academia, where delivery is near the bottom of a seemingly arbitrary 
ranking of the rhetorical canons. According to Ong, 
Rhetoric itself gradually but inevitably migrated from the oral to the 
chirographic world. From classic antiquity, the verbal skills learned 
in rhetoric were put to use not only in oratory, but also in writing. By 
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the sixteenth century, rhetoric textbooks were commonly omitting 
from the traditional five parts of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, 
style, memory, and delivery) the fourth part, memory, which was 
not applicable to writing. They were also minimizing the last part, 
delivery. By and large, they made these changes with specious 
explanations or no explanations at all. Today, when curricula list 
rhetoric as a subject, it simply means the study of how to write 
effectively. (113) 
The study of oratory was carried by universities through the middle ages 
and into 19th century liberal arts colleges; it was considered a prestigious, 
“lawyerly” skill that was necessary to success, particularly if the learner wanted to 
pursue a role in higher society (Ostrander 104). Participation in public 
discourse—obtaining a role in the decision-making culture—hinged on the ability 
to command an audience. “Politicking” wasn’t limited to composition—though 
newsprint was still a popular means of persuasion—and anyone from a preacher 
to a potential sheriff knew the centrality of delivery in their campaign.   
In the late nineteenth-century, as a perceived literacy crisis sparked 
assessment practices that could be more consistently reviewed, oration became 
all but obsolete in English classrooms where instructors felt compelled to locate 
rhetorical studies in the examination and production of print texts. As oration was 
sidelined by attention to print literacy, delivery, which primarily deals with the 
extralinguistic elements of oration rather than in words, became less prominent in 
the English departments of universities. Perhaps because of the 
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compartmentalization of English and communications studies, or perhaps 
because of the sociolinguistic shift from oral to print literacy, delivery, along with 
memory, has been marginalized by a tradition of attention to the other three 
rhetorical canons. Winifred Bryan Horner discusses, in his introduction to Fred 
Reynolds’ Rhetorical Memory and Delivery, the tendency of rhetoric to lend itself 
to confinement by one or two parts of the rhetorical canon: 
For example, Renaissance rhetoric limited itself largely to figures of 
speech, and eighteenth-century rhetoric was concerned with the 
last canon in its emphasis on elocution, where style became 
delivery. In the nineteenth century, rhetoric became the study of 
English literature, largely confined to the study of style. In spite of 
these truncations, the classical canons have persisted over the 
years, enlarging or diminishing to accommodate the latest fads. (ix) 
The current-traditional rhetoric of the earlier twentieth-century has largely been 
denounced by the academic community for its lack of consideration for invention, 
but the process and post-process pedagogies of many of today’s composition 
classrooms (though holding invention in adequate reverence) still echoes the 
same historical exclusions of parts of the canon. Today’s focus on invention 
allows English teachers and composition textbooks to all but skirt the issues of 
memory and delivery. The most oft-used excuse for this mistreatment of delivery, 
according to Fred Reynolds, is society’s transition from oral literacy to print 
literacy (4).  
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Unfortunately, this exclusion allows English studies to miss the rhetorical 
boat by not allowing room for the back-and-forth of debate or practice with the 
timing (kairos) that is so essential to effective rhetoric and, more basely, rich 
communication. The ability to respond with speed and accuracy to an immediate 
stimulus, to “observe, in any given situation, the available means of persuasion,” 
is what rhetorical studies were founded on. Spontaneity has a tremendous ability 
to override any systematic reasoning about the process of communication; 
composition can never be anything but flat if it isn’t informed by practice with the 
unpredictable timing of real-world rhetorical situations.  
I suspect that while this issue of the “problem canons” (Reynolds 4) is not 
at the forefront of the collective mind, somewhere, among the tweeting, trolling, 
status-updating members of what’s been dubbed the “instant messaging 
generation” (“Rise of the Instant-Messaging Generation”), lingers a compulsion to 
rescue delivery from the shadows. As Laura Gurak discusses in Cyberliteracy, 
the speed and intensity with which many online conversations take place mimics 
the immediacy of face-to-face interactions, sharing as many, if not more, 
characteristics with orality as with print literacy. That text messaging and emailing 
are so quickly surpassing face-to-face communication, particularly among the 73 
percent of American teenagers “wired-in” (“Rise of the Instant-Message-
Generation”), suggests that high-school and college-aged students are taking 
their conversations to a more oral and more public forum, where print literacy 
only constitutes half of the criteria for communication.  
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Homeric and pre-Homeric Greeks, like oral peoples generally, 
practiced public speaking with great skill long before their skills 
were reduced to an [art], that is, to a body of sequentially 
organized, scientific principles which explained and abetted what 
verbal persuasion consisted in. (Ong 106-107) 
It appears that, rather than looking to formal education for instruction in 
orality, people are turning to their online peers for authority, in a space where 
they are free to contract new linguistic codes, forming themselves in accordance 
with the demands of technology.  
The space in which the sociopolitical dialogue is allowed to take place is 
dictated by culture codes. Michel Foucault described these culturally-determined 
spaces as elements of what he calls “discursive formations”: the socially 
contracted rules that establish who can contribute to the dialogue, what they can 
talk about, and how they can speak. Traditionally, education in the arts and 
letters has been located in the academy, where the rhetorical focus has been 
generally reduced, over time, to all but exclude memory and delivery from 
English studies. However, the move toward post modernism in the twentieth 
century has led to a more collective creation of these discursive spaces. In The 
Electronic Word, Richard Lanham describes the social, technological and 
theoretical pressures that have caused a reevaluation of the “core curriculum” of 
universities. Where education once attempted to “democratize access to higher 
education by raising admissions standards” (102), the extension of enrollment 
opportunities to women and minorities, and the resulting need for bilingualism 
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has altered the way that people do and should approach composition. 
Technology facilitates this process by allowing people to simultaneously create 
and absorb. In his lecture, “Laws That Choke Creativity,” Lawrence Lessig 
similarly points out a move from what he calls a “read-only” method of developing 
culture to a “read-write” method that allows citizen participation and competition 
by breaking up the “legal cartel over access to [art]” (7:15). Like Lanham, Lessig 
views the communication and content production of these online discursive 
spaces as a collective attempt to dispense with the “arbitrary” (Lanham Electronic 
Word 15) separation—by some form of institution, be it of education or 
government—between what is “good” and what is “popular.” 
Average citizens have relocated composition in the online world, where 
the greater emphasis is not so limited to invention and arrangement but, as Ong 
and Gurak point out, extends to offer delivery a more prominent role. Nancy 
Welch, in Living Room: Teaching Public Education in a Privatized World, 
discusses how the narrow elitism and “neoliberal privatization” of education, over 
the past few decades, has allowed so many voices to get left squeaking from the 
sidelines. This, she says, has necessitated the creation of outside spaces, by 
those marginalized voices, in which they can be heard—a process that demands 
the attention of scholarship: 
[S]cholars have also broadened the study of delivery to include 
eighteenth-century pulpits and twenty-first-century blogs--
predominantly middle-class forums spotlighting individual rhetors 
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that nevertheless can be further expanded to include the working-
class rhetorical arts of the soapbox, picket, sit-down and strike. (5)  
From these newly-formed spaces, a few questions arise: what values hold the 
participants of those dialogues together, what linguistic or rhetorical guidance are 
they receiving (if they need guidance), what does a diminished notion of 
ownership do to authority and what happens when all of those voices are trying 
to be heard at once? The rampant production of web-texts and collective 
information archives has certainly aroused fear in Silicon Valley. The greatest 
concern seems to be that, when there are so many people speaking in the same 
space and when there aren’t restrictions on the creation and dissemination of 
information, the dialogue is reduced to the lowest common denominator.  This 
phenomenological hive-mind has caused a severe reduction in the credibility of 
content (Lanier 61, 70, 120). Jaron Lanier, for instance, describes the online 
crowd-wisdom—a dulled dialogue resulting from the presence of too many 
collaborators—as “the oracle illusion” (138-42). The oracle illusion describes the 
tendency of web-users to assume that the information they access is legitimate, 
thus failing to critically evaluate content which may or may not have an 
attributable author. 
There is also concern that this kind of digital collectivism neglects the 
authority of “experts.” Certainly granting sole authority to the academic elite is 
dehumanizing in more ways than one, but something potentially dangerous 
occurs under the assumption that everyone is equally qualified to speak on a 
subject. Andrew Keen, in Cult of the Amateur, describes this loose circulation of 
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information on the web as a kind of abandonment of propriety that undermines 
the innovation of professionals who have educations, experience, editors and 
fact-checkers (23, 35, 55). At its most extreme, this elitism is precisely the 
mentality that prodded those benched voices to create the discursive spaces of 
the Web. However, people with education and experience have a tendency to 
produce more reliable information than those who do not, and attempting to 
ignore that gap in the quality of content could be damaging.  
An even more terrifying prospect is that even a scholarly textual artifact, or 
otherwise “expertly” mediated piece of information, is vulnerable to tampering, 
left to the “spin” someone may put on it, by its exposure to the electronic 
environment. Most web users have probably had the humiliating experience of 
referencing a tendentiously excerpted rendition of a whole cloth text, only to be 
corrected by someone who looked a little harder to find the original text in its 
context. If one credible piece of content is allowed to be handled and 
subsequently bastardized, bowdlerized, or otherwise manipulated by the average 
Internet user, the result is that the most accessible or most popular version of 
that original content will have been shaped by crowd-wisdom (Keen 83) and will 
subsequently become the nucleus of Lanier’s oracle illusion.  
So, what do all of these fears have to do with education?  If an aim of 
rhetoric is to assess degrees of credibility (Booth 157) and if the online spaces 
where the conversations are taking place (Welch 5) are exposed to corrupted 
information (Lanier 177), then there is a need for guidance in critical evaluation of 
information. If that guidance isn’t coming from within those online spaces, where 
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expertise is questionable, and reliable leaders of the conversations are few and 
far between (Keen 35, 55), then guidance must come from outside of those 
spaces and the most logical place to locate that instruction is in the academy. 
The people that are forming their sociopolitical identities with information gleaned 
from status updates and tweets are not likely looking to Jaron Lanier and Andrew 
Keen for advice on how to read and write on the Web. In order for cyberliteracy—
proficiency with producing and evaluating content online—to spread, the 
conversations of Silicon Valley must be repositioned so that they are 
conspicuously located in the institutions of education.  
The problem, according to many theorists, is that many academics appear 
to be inherently disinclined to refocus the dialogue on technology. In “Technology 
and Literacy: A Story About the Perils of Not Paying Attention,” Cynthia L. Selfe 
discusses the scholarly aversion to the technology conversation: 
[T]he one topic serving as a focus for my own professional 
involvement—that of computer technology and its use in teaching 
composition—seems to be the single subject best guaranteed to 
inspire glazed eyes and indifference in that portion of the CCCC 
membership which does not immediately sink into snooze mode 
(qtd. In Miller 1163-64).  
Selfe offers that while there are indeed “pockets of technology scholars 
and teachers here and there,” academics “as a group, [tend] to hold in common a 
general distrust of the machine” (Miller 1164) that allows them to justify turning 
their backs on the conversation of technology and composition. That distrust runs 
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parallel to a familiarity with the traditional technologies—print—that those 
academics likely relied on for their own educations and therefore implicitly trust 
(1165). In allowing those attitudes to continue, academics are not just pushing 
technology out of the dialogue but are necessarily pushing delivery out of it. By 
privileging traditional literacies—reading and writing—over others (in this case, 
the orality of online composition), academics not only devalue certain abilities 
(Gurak 12), but do themselves a disservice by not recognizing that, by 2012, life 
is mediated by the Internet. Continuing to hold cyberliteracy as secondary, at 
best, or altogether unimportant, at worst, is the surest way to confine academia 
to a vacuum. In that instance, education’s best hope would be that people will 
continue to check in, from time to time, to make sure their cover-letters are 
formatted properly and their participles aren’t left dangling.  
Undoubtedly, things like emoticons and texting language fit cumbersomely 
into current academic approaches to online composition, but their use and 
implications still must be addressed. Here’s why: the Internet functions as a kind 
of modern-day Assembly of the Plebs. Oration was once central to preserving the 
Republic; it maintained values and gave voice to the People. While those who 
held a magistracy were responsible for the last stages of decision-making, 
elections and legislation were ultimately dominated by the Assembly of the Plebs 
(May and Wisse 4-5). The Senate’s job was to persuade those people how to 
vote, but including “commoners” in the dialogue was a way to keep average 
citizens active in the political sphere. When Cicero wrote De Oratore, it was to 
teach people how to change the system. At the time, Marcus Crassus, Caesar 
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and General Pompeii had just formed the First Triumvirate in an attempt to 
centralize power by diminishing the role of Senate and therefore the People (9). 
Cicero points out the centrality of oration to Roman culture and the emphasis 
rejects the systematic approaches taken by popular models of rhetoric (10). He 
encourages people to use the “weapons always within [their] grasp”(I: 32) to not 
only adapt to a specific situation, but to keep those privileged few from exerting 
too much control over citizens’ social realities. The beauty of eloquence in 
speaking is that people are always glad to see one of their own rise up and move 
a listless nation (I: 225-26, II: 35) because it represents the ability of the 
community to become informed and communicate—the biggest possible threat to 
the establishment.  
To a degree, the Internet serves in the same capacity as the Assembly of 
the Plebs, allowing average citizens to maintain an amount of power that they 
wouldn’t otherwise have, in a discursive space where, according to theorists like 
Richard Lanham, the line between low and high culture is decidedly blurred 
(Electronic Word 14). For instance, politically, the buzz of information on the web 
keeps questionable government officials from becoming too high handed. It’s 
probably no coincidence that the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and Protect IP 
Act (PIPA) went up for congressional vote so soon after the Occupy Wallstreet 
Movement (which eventually included pepper-spray, teargas, and Molotov-
cocktails) proved how quickly it could mobilize support online. As Google and 
Wikipedia (as well as thousands of other search engines, social networks, and 
information collectives) blacked out their websites, replacing usual content with 
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petitions against SOPA/PIPA, the bill was dropped before it ever made it to the 
vote. In this instance, it’s easy to see how the web acts as a vehicle for the 
reclamation of power by the People. When an establishment told them “no,” the 
People, armed with the Internet, made a pretty grand display of how much bigger 
they are than that establishment. Luckily the establishment changed its decree to 
“yes;” imagine the consequences if the institution of government had failed to 
revise their position. Imagine the consequences if the institution of education 
says “no” to the millions of people who have already proved that they are willing 
to strike down oppression wielding these new social contracts that make up the 
Internet. For better or worse, new norms are being created from the bits and 
bytes of technology and those norms will be privileged by the People, over all the 
ideals and regulations that are put upon them by an establishment, every time. 
  
31 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE USE OF EMOTICONS IN CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
It is important that students bring a certain ragamuffin, barefoot irreverence to 
their studies; they are not there to worship what is known, but to question it. 
 
       —Jacob Bronowski 
 
 
 
The rise of computer technology has necessitated a reevaluation of traditional 
composition processes and has begun to distance composition from the 
university. The widespread use of emoticons indicates that, not only is delivery 
becoming a focal point of composition outside of the classroom, but that the 
pathetic appeals made by stylistic elements like emoticons are surpassing the 
academic demand for logical appeal. Emoticons are only one subset of a deeply 
rhetorical and visual-inclusive lingua franca of the Internet which suggests that 
rhetoric is becoming privileged, by average citizens, over philosophy. Richard 
Lanham, in The Electronic Word, offers that the recently reanimated classical 
debate between philosophers and rhetoricians pits print (what he describes as a 
philosophical medium) against technology (a rhetorical medium) and that 
technology appears to be winning out (xii). Electronic writing, which consists of 
near-equal parts print literacy and oral literacy, seems to be a collective means of 
helping rhetoric get back to its roots which, according to Walter Ong, are in public 
speaking: 
The Greek rhetor is from the same root as the Latin orator and 
means a public speaker…it would appear obvious that in a very 
deep sense the rhetorical tradition represented the old oral world 
32 
 
 
and the philosophic tradition the new chirographic structures of 
thought (106). 
Lanham looks at the contrast between print texts and electronic texts as 
representative of the classical argument between philosophy and rhetoric. “What 
Plato wanted above all to exile from his utopia, like Thomas More after him, was 
style, the unabridged range of ornament, of purposeless play” (57). Where Plato 
advocated for clarity and authority, characteristics that Lanham claims are 
embodied by print texts, the Sophists found value in the fluidity and versatility of 
language, characteristics that are embodied by the orality and style of Web 
content and the ability of electronic texts to blend words with sounds and images 
(31-34, 200-203). The collective pull toward technology allows us to view online 
communication and composition, as Lanham suggests, as a development 
“following the main ‘operating system’ disagreement of our time, not driving it” 
(xii). Because it’s within the academy’s purview to enable students’ maximal 
effectiveness in their composition, scholarship has a duty to look at the elements 
of online composition—including emoticons and texting language—to determine 
their uses, as well as the social relationships and culture codes that brought 
about their formation, in order to determine if and how to address their use in the 
academy.  
 As with face-to-face communication, online communication consists of 
interpreting a mixture of words and nonverbal cues. Visual nonverbal cues—like 
facial expressions, body language, and gestures—are accounted for online, in 
part, by the use of emoticons and texting language. For instance, a user can 
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indicate sadness  or cheer . By “winking” at one user ;) another user is able 
to indicate cheek or mischievousness or can simply use a regular type pad to 
create any emotionally-representative visual cue he likes to accompany his 
written text as—for instance anger >:(( or kissing ;-x icons. One could recreate 
the image of sticking the tongue between the lips and blowing by using an icon 
like :PPP or type :)) to display a toothy grin. Similarly, acronyms like ROFL 
(Rolling On the Floor Laughing) or SMH (Shaking My Head) can indicate physical 
gestures that might pop up in a face to face interaction and actorisks like *gazes 
wistfully into nothing* or *shakes fists at heavens* can add “extra-alphabetical” 
(here, meaning gestural albeit written) cues to a textually-based message. 
Though these gesture-symbols are necessarily keyed-in and, such is the case 
with actorisks, sometimes written-out, they represent the extra-alphabetical cues 
that one would be able to observe in a face to face interaction. A small but 
weighty difference between “real life” gestures and electronic gestures—beyond 
the obvious aesthetics—is that one can almost invariably assume that electronic 
gestures are intentional, whereas “real life” gestures are sometimes unconscious. 
It may seem that this requirement for intention somehow diminishes the sincerity 
or validity of a gesture since it can hardly be unconscious, but there is evidence 
to suggest that employing an electronic gesture can be a tremendously effective 
rhetorical tool. As mentioned in the previous chapter, these electronic gestures 
can act as a tool for pathos, the mode of persuasion with which the rhetorical 
canon of delivery is primarily concerned.  
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In examining how gestures are used in tandem with utterances, Adam 
Kendon finds that the gesture, in a face-to-face interaction, is generally deployed 
first. That is, the actual, physical gesture begins before the particular word or 
word phrase that it is intended to modify, and therefore requires an amount of 
planning (127). What Kendon describes as the “nucleus” of the gesture generally 
lands on the specific word that requires modification (124). That such forethought 
is required signifies that, in using a gesture for clarification, a person must 
anticipate misunderstanding. In CMC, the interface plays two conflicting roles in 
the transmission of messages containing both written language and gesture 
symbols.  
On the one hand, CMC offers a more open invitation to premeditated 
gesture.  There is more room for misinterpretation in a computer mediated 
scenario than in a face-to-face scenario. I.A. Richards suggests rhetoric should 
be the “study of misunderstanding and its remedies” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 31). 
In CMC, where misunderstanding is imminent, emoticons are the cure for what 
ails you. In the electronic environment, the absence of a visible human body 
inherently dulls paralinguistic cues like tone and body language and necessitates 
some kind of substitution, a “replacement gesture,” for those cues.  Where 
gestures may manifest at a more subconscious level in a face-to-face interaction, 
Internet communication requires that the speaker be conscious enough of his 
audience to preemptively leverage gesture, as a pathetic clarifier, against 
possible misunderstanding. In this respect, the replacement gestures required by 
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online communication are a more rhetorically effective form of gesture than their 
physical counterparts. 
On the other hand, Kendon’s observation—that a gesture, from inception 
to fruition, extends beyond the linguistic unit it modifies—is made moot by an 
interface which only allots one space to a gesture. In a face-to-face interaction, a 
person presenting a questionable idea may shrug to show humility: as they say 
“maybe we should privatize education,” the shoulders may begin to move upward 
from resting on the word “should” and not return to resting until the end of the 
sentence. In a print environment, however, the gesture symbol may only be an 
actorisk punctuating the sentence: In the line, “Maybe we should privatize 
education *shrugs*” the gesture appears more fleeting. The brevity of the 
gesture, in the computer-mediated scenario, likely affects the meaning of the 
message differently than the more long-lived gesture of the face-to-face scenario, 
though the physical gesture and the actorisk act similarly to reflect the internal 
modesty of the speaker which is not conveyed verbally. In addition, the “nucleus” 
of the replacement gesture does not coincide with the word it intends to modify. 
To achieve an effect similar to the face-to-face scenario, the reader must 
assume, from prior interactions, that *shrugs* runs naturally parallel to “should” or 
the speaker must compensate by highlighting the import of the stressed word, for 
instance, by italicizing it. So, the interface necessitates audience-conscious 
replacement gestures that can tackle misunderstanding on a deeper level than 
words alone.   
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Gurak’s studies of the debates around two privacy issues—an encryption 
standard proposed under the Clinton administration,  called the “clipper chip,” 
and the information sharing made possible by Lotus Marketplace in the early 
1990’s—showed that emoticons played a quantifiable role in controlling the 
climate of communication. The clipper chip, an algorithm developed by the 
National Security Agency, caused public outcry because of its capacity to subject 
citizens to what, prior to the Patriot Act, was considered illegal government 
surveillance. The debates Gurak examined took place in an online forum where 
people discussed the privacy issues associated with the clipper chip and with 
Lotus Marketplace, a searchable database program that contained personal 
information (including purchasing habits) of 80 million American households. 
Naturally, those conversations were subject to strong sentiment and, at times, 
incivility. The most forceful of comments, including those left by “flamers,” 
included only text and used language that favored the principle of agency over 
the principle of communion (Persuasion and Privacy 108-12). Interestingly 
emoticon use was, in this case, singular to female conversation, “used to deflect 
the tension of a situation and provide a bit of comfort to the reader.” Similarly, 
another 1997 study by Witmer and Katzman looked at 3,000 computer-mediated 
messages and found that women were nearly twice as likely to augment their 
written messages with emoticons or texting language (D’Addario and Walthers 
327). In 2000, Wolf performed a similar study, in a mixed gender group, and 
found that men were more likely to adopt the communicative habits—specifically 
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the use of emoticons as modifiers—of the women in the group, than the women 
were to drop these modifiers in favor of text-only communication (327).  
Within Gurak’s observations about gender and language, some of the less 
combative contributors, who augmented their comments with emoticons, appear 
soft by comparison: “Her smiley […] is a device found rarely, if at all, among male 
participants in the clipper chip case, who, instead of attenuating any of their 
assertions, asserted their opinions strongly” (Persuasion and Privacy 112). That 
the persuasive power of a smile is grounded in submissiveness or passivity is 
relatively established idea. Richard Conniff writes: 
Smiling is our oldest and most natural expression, and like other 
facial expressions, it evolved for a function as a means of 
responding to people around us and influencing their behavior. 
Primatologists connect our smile to the “fear grin” in monkeys and 
date its evolution back at least thirty million years. In a group of 
Macaques, for example, the approach of the alpha may cause a 
subordinate to cringe and nervously pull back the corners of the 
mouth, exposing clenched teeth. It’s a signal meaning “I’m no 
threat.” For humans, too […] this sort of smile is a way to disarm 
and reassure those around us, particularly our social superiors. (1) 
In the Lotus study, the arguments modified by this apparently yielding use 
of emoticons as an act of submission or humility seemed to be not only well 
informed, but particularly adversarial, suggesting that the smiley face was applied 
in the manner Conniff describes, to reduce what could otherwise be perceived as 
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menacing. With the separation of physical bodies by a computer and the 
indefinitely large space it represents, emoticons can serve as an effective 
rhetorical tool in much the same way as the facial expressions of a speaker in a 
face-to-face situation. With the many variations of a smile, wink, frown or smirk, it 
may be easy for a listener to read more into a physical facial expression than the 
speaker actually intended. Our readings of other people’s nonverbal cues are 
certainly informed by prior interactions with human beings, but with less variation 
in the expressions (there are a limited number of smiley faces online, compared 
to the millions of variations found on human faces) the audience has to 
participate more actively in determining what those expressions mean.  
One of the strengths of the emoticon use in the protests about the clipper 
chip was that, by contrasting the nature of their written language with a gestural 
symbol, the contributors were embodying Quintilian’s theory that the more 
powerful gestures reflect the orator’s thoughts, rather than his words. While 
statements in forums like the Lotus Marketplace protests have been 
inflammatory, altercations were avoided and the statement clarified or made 
richer by the addition of a well-meaning gesture. Like Quintilian and Cicero both 
counsel, the gestures were contained within the statement, and did not extend 
beyond it (Kendon 19) and like Ong, cited by Gurak, suggests, this usage hits a 
midway point between spoken and written language that requires of the speaker 
proficiency in both realms (Cyberliteracy 14).  
 There are scenarios in which emoticons play a critical artistic and 
potentially pedagogical role and which point at means that may be used to 
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rescue gesture from the trash bin of composition studies. While emoticons are 
primarily used to augment textual messages—as in the cases of Gurak’s clipper 
chip study, my email with Maloree, and Mitch Marzoni’s tragically-executed text 
message—there are a few new composition formats evolving that exemplify 
Ong’s second orality by placing emoticons at the visual center of electronic 
communication, where words would otherwise be. For instance, the remix, hailed 
by scholars like Lawrence Lessig as the kind of collective creativity that will 
salvage our culture (“Reexaming the Remix”), is beginning to welcome emoticons 
into its folds. Sites like YouTube have begun to see an influx of what are being 
dubbed “emoticoncerts.” Emoticoncerts are effectively music videos—visual 
stories set to the backdrop of popular music—which use emoticons to punctuate 
the emotional appeals of the lyrics. For example, this 2006 emoticoncert, carried 
out to the Gary Jules version of “Mad World,” highlights what are, for this 
particular user, the most valuable parts of the song: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJvA5S76ywo  
The visuals are sparse and crude, but the light application of them, here, could 
mean an even more meaningful experience for the viewer than would be the 
original video: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYY-a0_Bb9Y 
The lyrics of the song and the title itself, “Mad World,” indicate a kind of 
nonsensical surrealism that can’t be fully captured by images of a “real world.” 
Though the director of the original music video found a way to mimic this 
detachment by emphasizing the social whole and depersonalizing the individuals 
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on the street, the performance is still very human and visceral compared to the 
denotations of the lyrics. The beginning lines of the song describe the sea “worn 
out faces” with “no expression” in which the author is drowning (1:04). Relative to 
that theme, the emoticoncert achieves something different than did the original 
video: it places the focus—like the lyrics—on the sentiment itself, rather than the 
individual, by allowing emotions to be expressed by a body which lacks identity, a 
body with no unique standing among its fellows: it’s just the same yellow face 
with a wealth of different feelings. This combination of text and visual imparts 
understanding beyond that which listening to the song, watching the original 
music video, or even reading the lyrics does, by spotlighting the emotional 
appeals of the song with visuals that are purely referential to those emotions. The 
lyrics of “Mad World” describe the outlooks of an author who feels he lacks 
legitimacy, agency, and the means to identify with the people around him. They 
paint a picture of a world that makes no sense, to which he is incapable of 
applying logic. With ethos and logos stripped away, his argument must rest on 
pathos, and the creator of this emoticoncert has captured this theme exactly.  
Furthermore, the creation of this emoticoncert demonstrates an incredibly 
deep and unique understanding of the original song. None of the emoticons 
appear haphazardly selected and those chosen by the creator indicate a rich 
reading of the lyrics. For instance, he uses an “angelic” emoticon to punctuate 
“feel the way that every child should” (2:04) and a “bewildered” emoticon, which 
appears simultaneously absorbent and thoughtless, to punctuate the following 
lines, repeated twice over “sit and listen” (2:10). The song describes the 
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anonymity of public education with the lines “Went to school and I was very 
nervous/no one knew me,” which the author of the emoticoncert chose to 
supplement with a down-trodden emoticon holding its fingers in an “L” at its 
forehead, the pop culture symbol for “loser.” By the time “Teacher, tell me what’s 
my lesson/look right through me,” rolls around, the emoticon has turned into an 
apathetic one which gazes off into the distance (2:20). Those selections indicate 
that the creator of the emoticoncert not only understands the complexity of what’s 
expected of children in education and society, but the effect that those 
expectations have on the individual. The song itself does not directly equate 
happy children with angels, anonymity with low self-esteem or neglect with 
apathy—those connections were established by the author of the emoticoncert 
through his intimacy with the original material. It’s perhaps too hopeful to assume 
that creating an emoticoncert would ever be widely used by educators to assess 
a student’s understanding of a piece of content, but it’s evident, through this 
creation, that the author has gone far beneath the surface of the song. He has 
not merely listened to the song or read the lyrics, but has married them with his 
personal experiences in order to create an artifact that reflects his own 
meaningful interaction with them.  Incidentally, the creator of this emoticoncert 
claims, in his posting of it on Youtube, that his intended effect (winning the 
affections of a girl) was achieved by manipulating the more pathetic cues of this 
song to “impress [her with his] naturally hidden male sensitivity” (JegStuffoInfo). 
Emoticons are also being used for artistic mediums that are, to my 
knowledge, not yet categorized. If innovation is being squelched by the influx of 
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meme-saturated texting language, as Keen and Lanier suggest, then the use of 
emoticons in creating and remixing content seems to be one practice that’s 
keeping that innovation afloat. Take for instance, this story “of mixed emoticons,” 
created by poet and star of “Iconic Iconic America,” Rives. He offers a visual 
presentation consisting entirely of emoticons and acronyms, while narrating (off-
screen) the story of a boy who becomes infatuated with a stranger. 
http://www.ted.com/talks/rives_tells_a_story_of_mixed_emoticons.h
tml  
The artistic and literary worth of this piece of content is certainly multi-faceted, a 
product of the first wave of what could eventually be a rich and entirely new 
school of creativity. The “boy meets girl” story has been remediated in more ways 
than could be counted, but this rendition is unique. The poem’s most apparent 
value lies in its ability to speak to those audiences which find comfort in the 
texting language of electronic communication. If the Internet is where we now 
locate our discourse, then Rives shows us that computer-mediated 
communication has found a new artistic commodity (emoticon manipulation) 
capable of incentivizing the endangered cultural tradition of oral storytelling.  
By the time Rives created this piece, emoticons had not yet (and still have 
not) expanded to include those nouns and prepositions that allow a thought to be 
fully articulated. The visuals could not stand independently of the words he’s 
actually speaking.  Though Rives’ emoticons were self-created, there simply 
were not enough of them to accurately tell a story with only pictographs and, if 
the sound were turned off on this video, it would be hard to extrapolate meaning 
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from this particular string of images. The fact remains, though, that a critic would 
be hard-pressed to deny the special kind of innovation that it required for this 
pioneering poet to take these elements of new media and create with them an 
entirely new spin on an age-old tale.  
Unlike the forum comments in Gurak’s study or the visuals punctuating 
“Mad World” in the emoticoncert, Rives’ poem puts the visual rhetoric at the 
forefront. It rather seems that, at best the verbal and visual were born 
simultaneously or, more likely, the emoticons were conceived of first and the 
words were formed around it. As the symbol O}-< appears on the screen, Rives 
reads “that means guy,” followed by Q<= “and this is a ponytail on a passerby” 
(0:32). This visual-first creation process eventually leads to some 
characterizations of unrequited love that are anything but cliché and includes the 
painting of his heart’s desire on a coffee mug (1:20), the pegging of his heartbeat 
as “the morse code for inappropriate” (1:53) and the expansion of the acronym 
YLLAM (You Look Like A Mermaid) into YLLAMBYWLAW (You Look Like A 
Mermaid But You Walk Like A Waltz) (1:38). Perhaps the most artful description 
is of himself, compared to “a monkey blowing kisses at a butterfly” (2:12). None 
of these completely original contributions to the “boy meets girl” repertoire would 
have been possible—or, at least, made much sense—without a visual to lead 
them in.   
The poem, like the emoticoncert, locates emoticons at the visual center of 
composition, but still upholds the Ciceronian principle of supplementing words, 
rather than replacing them (Kendon 19), since neither the poem nor the 
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emoticoncert could function without the use of spoken word. There are other 
types of compositions currently floating around the web which attempt to do just 
the opposite. The literary value of these compositions hinges on a reader’s basic 
knowledge of a pre-existing text but there is certainly an implication that this 
demonstration of the relationship between language and gesture represents a 
complex engagement with an original piece of content. The following is Jane 
Austen’s most famous novel, Pride and Prejudice, revisioned in emoticons: 
http://bookshop.livejournal.com/1010612.html 
The entire piece of content is a succession of emoticons that are intended to 
represent the most emotionally salient moments of the novel. Save for the part 
where Mr. Darcy appears to be murdering Elizabeth Bennet with a pick-axe, it’s a 
relatively emotionally-accurate portrayal of the story’s climate. As mentioned 
earlier, it would be impossible for a reader to parse “Pride and Prejudice in 
Emoticons” if she did not already have knowledge of the basic plot of the original 
book and, perhaps because of that requirement, emoticon-only artifacts are 
much rarer than those which use emoticons in combination with written word. It 
may seem that the artistic worth of a creation like this is slight but it could be 
argued that if it encourages even one of its viewers to engage with a classic 
literature, it’s a good thing. While it may seem like mere novelty, the very creation 
of this piece of content shows a deep understanding of the emotional appeals of 
a story and the value of this particular story hinges on the reader’s ability to parse 
the emotionally complex relationships between the characters. Certainly, “Pride 
and Prejudice in Emoticons” couldn’t relay those complexities or a 
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comprehensive plot-line to someone who is unfamiliar with the reading, but its 
worth lies in the merging of the “good” and “popular”—those things Lanham 
describes as arbitrarily separated by scholarship (Electronic Word 15)—to 
demonstrate engagement with the text. The creator of this piece of art has 
brought something that exists primarily in literary culture to Amanda Lenhart’s 
“Instant Messaging Generation.” Richard Lanham writes on the significance of 
digitized rhetoric to this blending of cultures: 
This rhetoric will make no individuous [sic] distinctions between 
high and low culture, commercial and pure usage, talented or 
chance creation, visual or auditory stimulus, iconic or alphabetic 
information. (Electronic Word 14) 
Walter Ong separates linguistic codes into “restricted” and “elaborated” 
(103). The restricted linguistic code describes the public, common language of 
low culture and the elaborated linguistic code describes the more private 
language of high culture. The creator of an electronic text, in binding low culture 
with high culture, good with popular, creates a bridge between these two worlds, 
just as Lanham prophesied. He offers one side passage to the other by using 
elements beloved by both cultures, helping foster a deeper connection between 
the two. Within his creation, neither side is as foreign to the other as it might have 
once been and the creator has inadvertently supplied educators with a new tool 
for assessment that can bring the rich literature of academia into the electronic 
world of visuals, icons, and novelty that is so much a part of student’s lives.  
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 All of these innovative uses of emoticons—which seamlessly blend the 
visual with the textual, the conversational with the written, and which bridge that 
separation between cultures—possess the capacity to function as learning tools 
for educators who fear a loss of their students to the novelties of electronic 
communication. Lanham’s prediction that the Internet would muddy the line 
between low and high culture has come true, and that’s not necessarily an 
unhappy thing. These forms, which are only the tip of the visual-textual iceberg, 
have the ability to marry what students actually want with what teachers want 
them to want. They are accessible. As a means to intellectual discovery, the 
worth of those formats—a term I use without any supposition that they are 
“fixed”—is unparalleled by anything less open to those elements of online 
communication to which educators still seem so averse. Perhaps, then, it’s time 
for academics to reevaluate what may be combative approaches to the 
emoticons and texting language of the Internet and, instead, use those elements 
to bind what students need with what students love. There is a new need for the 
academy to prepare students for the rhetorical demands of this changing world—
to legitimize their language, to offer them direction, and to equip them with the 
skills to survive in the information economy.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: SURVIVING THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 
 
The only justification for repressive institutions is material and cultural deficit. But 
such institutions, at certain stages in history, produce and perpetuate such 
deficit, and even threaten human survival. 
 
       —Noam Chomsky   
  
 
In our “information economy,” the most valuable asset we have is the 
ability to control human attention through rhetoric—a process which Richard 
Lanham calls “the economics of attention” (7). As I’ll discuss further on in the 
chapter, Lanham’s theory is predicated on the notion that, with the endless tides 
of content consistently flowing into and out of user perception, attention is 
needed to parse all of that information in order for people to share ideas in ways 
that can be understood. Like any economy, the attention economy is driven by 
resources, labor, and capital. Within this economy, emoticons exemplify a 
conceptual transformation of the labor and skills that are required to survive in 
today’s society. Certainly, listing “can effectively use emoticons” on a resume is 
probably not going to aid much in finding gainful employment. However, the 
functions of emoticons—as visual rhetoric, as gesture, as pathetic and ethical 
appeals to better approach misunderstanding—indicate that their use constitutes 
a recognition, by web users, of those communicative needs, as well as the desire 
to meet them.   
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In  his 2009 address to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, 
President Obama said “the future belongs to the nation that best educates it’s 
citizens” and that “education is no longer just a pathway to opportunity and 
success [but] a prerequisite” (Goldman). Education and economy have a 
symbiotic relationship. Eric Hanushek and Ludger Wossmann of The World Bank 
say that “for an economy, education can increase the human capital in the labor 
force, which increases labor productivity and thus leads to a higher equilibrium 
level of output,” and furthermore, that the quality of education correlates 
positively with economic growth (3-9). In this respect, the economy depends on 
education for stability. Conversely, education depends on the economy because 
the economy informs the teaching goals and therefore affects the success rate 
that helps education maintain a valuable status in society. The continuance of at 
least the social order and, at the most extreme, civilization is contingent on the 
obligate mutualism between economy and education. A community’s survival 
depends on its ability to adapt to the economic circumstances of the environment 
and it looks for survival skills in the academy. As the country tries to account for 
the economic shift toward information and attention, education is, in part, 
responsible for fostering those abilities in individual citizens.  
“Information economy” is an interdisciplinary phrase used to describe the 
current system of resource, labor, and capital. The idea behind the terminology is 
that the American economic focus is now on information and the information 
industry. Capital, resources, and labor are equally important to creating an 
economy, and the individual navigates this economy (thus determining his quality 
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of life within it) by directing the only component over which it is possible for him to 
have control: labor.  
If we are operating within an information economy, as Richard Lanham 
discusses in The Economics of Attention, then it seems natural to assume 
information is the scarce resource of that economy. However, anyone who has 
checked their email, logged onto a website, or read an article online this week 
can tell you how much information—much of which is unsolicited—can barrel 
down on top of a user as soon as they open their browser.  Online, a Google 
search can produce hundreds of different and conflicting answers to the same 
question, fake news reports go viral via Facebook, and sensationalism and hype 
run amok. On the Web, where so much of life is now taking place, information is 
less like a scarce resource and more like a constantly-shifting labyrinth of 
content. Richard Lanham, then, suggests that it is not information, but the 
“human attention needed to make sense of information,” that is the most valuable 
resource in this particular economy (Economics 6-7). In the framework of the 
information economy, the trusses, joists, and rafters are “attention structures” 
that allocate human attention (Electronic Word 240). Marketable skill therefore 
lies in being able to command the attention of the average American as they’re 
stricken by a daily bombardment of information made possible by an ever-
expanding media rhizome. 
Commanding attention in an electronic environment—where all voices are 
theoretically equal (or at least have an equal chance of being heard)—can’t 
simply be a matter of being louder, flashier or more reasonable. Foucault’s 
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discursive formations have been, for decades, a nigh foolproof way to make 
sense of the distribution of attention. There are socially specific ways to identify 
what can be said, who can say it and how that idea or information can be 
presented to a particular audience. However, the seeming boundlessness of the 
Internet seems to be actualizing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s idea of 
universal audience by allowing people to create and display content that is made 
available to far more than just one specific audience, indeed to anyone, from any 
demographic, who happens to stumble upon it.  This expansion of audience, 
which necessarily affects the accountability of the speaker, has brought into 
question the idea of authority and has altered the forms in which information is 
presented. In a place where countless audiences access countless digital 
artifacts, he who has the attention has the authority. 
Lanham describes his “economics of attention” as synonymous with 
“rhetoric.” Within this economy, he says, style and substance have traded places; 
since style attracts attention and attention is the hottest commodity, style has 
taken on a more prominent role, and the styles of electronic writing, compared to 
that of print text, have opened up new possibilities for attracting attention (xii). By 
filtering out any visual or audio distractions, by being “fixed and invisible” (80) 
print text creates an “economy of sensory denial” where the reader is forced to 
look through the text, rather than at it, in order to focus on the concepts of the 
work rather than the actual symbols of which is consists (46). Lanham points at 
“attention artists” like pop artist Andy Warhol who made their name by 
encouraging the public to look at the surface, rather than through it. He describes 
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Warhol’s famous soup can that won the attention of millions because “the surface 
was the meaning” (50). His success came from an ability to build art that 
attended to audience needs, rather than to his own introspection: 
We can see, too, that he understood the paradox of stuff. The stuff 
you dig out of the earth’s crust becomes, in an information 
economy, less important than the information that informs it, what 
you think about the stuff. Yet the more you ponder that information, 
the more you understand about that stuff, the more real the stuff 
becomes. To put it in terms of the art world Andy lived in, the more 
you see that style matters more than substance, the more you see 
the vital role, the vitality, of substance. So, like Andy, you pursue 
your twin hungers: for the spotlight and for collecting stuff, knowing 
that each needs the other to make it real. (53) 
When style is spotlighted, when human attention is drawn to the surface of 
a thing, people make meaning by oscillating between looking at and through. 
When an artist—a writer—purposefully highlights the veneer rather than what’s 
beneath it, he gives the audience permission to define their own concepts. This 
process is exemplified by “shape poetry,” the forming of words into an actual 
image that alters the audience’s reading process; rather than reading from left to 
right margin, from the top of the page to the bottom, the reading process takes on 
the shape of the image. Lanham describes the need for this combination of 
image and word: 
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Why combine an abstract alphabetical symbol with a visual image? 
Why did people continue to find it of interest for two and a half 
millennia? Because we want to heal the pains of abstraction. We 
want to insert the text into the three-dimensional physical world of 
stuff, just as we do with tombstones and public monuments. We 
want to bring the world of literacy, and all that literacy carries with it, 
into the world of objects and oral conversation. We want to breach 
the gulf between letters and the world of objects: our old friends, 
stuff and fluff. An utterance like this makes us toggle between the 
text, an abstract world, and a familiar three-dimensional object from 
our everyday world. (Economics 84) 
This theory, applied to electronic communication, paints a digestible picture of 
the human desire to incorporate images like emoticons into our online lexicon. 
Emoticons are a part of what Lanham describes as an “alphabet that thinks,” that 
causes the reader—who has been conditioned since grade school to look 
beyond the symbols to the meaning beneath—to look at the visual content of the 
symbols themselves (115). Text that “moves” (ie: shape art, websites, 
powerpoints, word art) is more desirable because the reader is allowed to linger 
at the surface, moving back and forth (like the text) between one-dimensional 
alphabetical and the three-dimensional behavior. The reading process becomes 
gestural. Emoticons, more than many elements of electronic writing, are “moving 
text” because they represent actual, physical kinesthesis. According to Lanham, 
the pedagogical emphasis on compositional elements like rhythm and imagery, 
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which show movement, attempts to recreate “in the printed text a pale 
simulacrum of gesture” (107). However, if the academy really wishes to equip 
students with the rhetorical tools to come by the attention of their audience and 
survive in the information economy, the academic treatment of “gesture” in 
writing must be readjusted.  
Arts and Letters are also at the center of the information economy, as 
Lanham describes, because those disciplines deal specifically with how people 
focus their attention (xii). Incidentally, this argues, in turn, that greater effort (and 
money) be spent on disciplines that have lagged behind the “hard” sciences in 
the level of support they command. This economy—which commoditizes human 
regard, deliberation, and responsiveness—requires a more style-oriented skill set 
which reevaluates the logocentrism of academia. Visual elements, like the 
emoticons discussed in the previous chapter, are decidedly more potent in this 
respect because of their capacity for presence. It’s no new news that people side 
with whomever they most closely identify (Burke 26-28, 44-45). The speaker 
accomplishes audience-adherence to an idea by making points of commonality 
stand out to an audience and, according to Charles Hill the best way to do that is 
with visuals: 
Presence as the term is used by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
refers to the extent to which an object or concept is foremost in the 
consciousness of audience members. Skillful rhetors attempt to 
increase the presence of elements in the rhetorical situation that 
are favorable to their claim because they know that elements with 
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enhanced presence will have a greater influence over the 
audience’s attitudes and beliefs. (Hill and Helmers 28-29) 
Rhetorical elements, like visuals, that facilitate presence are more effective 
because they allow other rhetorical elements to persuade by identification. A 
concept, says Hill, is most accessible when it is something that can be 
immediately, directly observed (29). We humans have a tendency to prefer 
instant gratification over time-consuming analysis because, simply put, we have 
a pretty severe inclination toward ease. People identify with visuals because they 
are more vivid (33). More vivid information elicits more of an emotional response, 
is more memorable, and creates more persuasive rhetoric (30-31). So, a painting 
is more persuasive than a narrative, which is more persuasive than statistics. 
Naturally, this is limited to relevant visuals that are intended to enhance meaning. 
People see something vivid enough that it fills their “entire field of consciousness” 
and that process acts as a sort of persuasive lubricant; in short, the audience is 
hopefully so taken with the saliency of rhetorical images that they won’t stop too 
long to consider its relevance or the validity of the argument to which it is 
purportedly relevant (29).  
 As Anthony Blair discusses in Hill and Helmers’ Defining Visual Rhetorics, 
arguments against the effectiveness of the visual rhetoric (to which something 
like emoticons will belong) includes objections against their tendency to be vague 
(46). This is especially true in the case of emoticons which, unlike photographs, 
do not have a unique referent with a singular identity; instead, they refer to an 
abstract concept (happiness, anger, or love) and the expressions which many 
55 
 
 
people tend to make in response to those concepts, but which appear different 
on every face. By not accounting for those variations in expressions, emoticons 
are certainly vague, but as scholars like Anthony Blaire, on the backs of greats 
like Richards and Burke, point out “the presence of ambiguity and vagueness in 
verbal arguments is very far from always being objectionable,” and precision is 
entirely necessity-based (47). The use of emoticons as text modifiers—as 
opposed to wordless visual argument only—does not require that they be 
precise, only that they serve to enhance the meaning of the argument. Emoticons 
are validated by their ability to make an argument more “real,” more “first-hand,” 
because they can be observed quickly and easily (51).  
The meaning of the emoticon’s emotional referent, or the speaker’s 
definition, isn’t just based on the reader’s own cultural norms but on his or her 
experiences with facial expression as an emotional response. If visuals make 
things more permanent and visceral and if emoticons represent not just a 
physical face, but an abstract emotion, then they do something different than 
words alone: they give the audience control. A visual that is representative of an 
emotion affords the audience their own mental image of their own unique 
definition of an emotion, rather than having forced upon them the speaker’s 
vision of that emotion. If a speaker were to wordily describe a moment of, say, 
disappointment, she diminishes the audience’s ability to use their own 
experiences, beliefs, and connections to inform their understanding of 
“disappointment,” because she has already defined it for them. By using an 
image, the speaker gives her audience agency, license to actively participate in 
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the creation of meaning, as she addresses them. Online, if a speaker were to 
insert a smiley face into an email, following a snide comment, the receiver may 
see it and imagine a wry smile on the face of the friend who wrote it. But, if the 
speaker were to follow the comment with “just kidding,” she has deprived the 
listener of his own unique (and therefore favored) vision of sarcasm. Allowing the 
reader this kind of control makes the rhetoric more approachable and 
memorable. By using an emoticon, an author not only draws audience attention 
to the value of the symbols themselves, to the surface—like Warhol’s 32 
Campbell’s Soup Cans—but uses images that permit the audience to define 
abstract concepts for themselves; that transfer of authority gives the audience an 
active rhetorical role.  
In an economy where getting, focusing, and keeping attention is the most 
valuable asset—where style is at the forefront of argument—using visuals to 
enhance communication is a nonfungible skill. This is not to say that, in order for 
students to leave school able to feed themselves, instructors must train them in 
the art of emoticon-deployment. It is only to say that, given the rise of emoticon 
use in the electronic environment, it would seem that the millions of web users 
who are using emoticons have already caught on to the importance of visuals to 
effective communication.  Indeed, these elements are a component of a new 
survival skill, and in more ways than one.  
 Earlier, I discussed how emoticons function as gesture in online 
communication. Though deployed more intentionally than some physical 
gestures, emoticons act as physical gestures in an environment which lacks two 
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human bodies and therefore body language.  If rhetoric, like Richards says, 
should be a “study of misunderstanding and its remedies” (qtd. in Foss, Foss, 
and Trapp 31), then gesture should have, at the very least, a supporting role in 
rhetorical studies.  
In the late 90s Beverly Sauer undertook a study, synthesized in The 
Rhetoric of Risk, of the rhetoric associated with hazardous material 
environments. A part of her study included a 1999 interview with Libby, a female 
miner, who explained on video the process of roof bolting. During the interview, 
Libby employed both mimetic gesture (gesture which demonstrates an act or 
points something out) and analytic gesture (gesture which comments on the thing 
or concept being articulated) to describe these roof bolting practices (228-30, 
260).  Sauer then showed the video, sans-audio, to several other miners (258, 
272-73). When the miners were asked to describe what they thought Libby was 
describing on the video, they incorporated similar gestures, demonstrating a 
process which Sauer (summarizing Martha Alibali) calls “communicative uptake.” 
Alibali used the example of a triangle to explain the notion of 
uptake. In a math class, for example, a teacher may depict a 
triangle with her two index fingers and thumbs. When students 
respond, they may trace a small triangle with their index fingers. In 
this transformation, students reproduce the teacher’s original idea 
in a new form. The new variant is smaller and incorporates motion. 
These changes in size and motion provide an image of the 
students’ conception of a triangle. The gestures help them 
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understand a new concept in their own terms—as speakers might 
elaborate the meaning of an obscure or difficult sentence in their 
own words. (273) 
This gestural exemplification of absorption and understanding, this 
communicative uptake, demonstrates a quicker and more meaningful 
comprehension of content, via extralingual elements. Gesture can be used by a 
speaker to better approach miscommunication and build meaning with the 
hearer. Sauer writes that “the speaker’s viewpoint [works] rhetorically to shape 
the audience’s rhetorical attention toward the speaker as a rhetorical agent who 
demonstrates how good speakers reenact, reframe, analyze, and reflect upon 
their own practice” (261). The speaker creates understanding through 
gesticulation. He collaborates with the hearer(s) to define abstract or weighted 
concepts, thereby binding his ethos to that of his audience. With this knowledge, 
things like actorisks (*fist pump*) seem slightly more legitimized. This process of 
understanding is similar to the immediate and steadfast conceptual adherence, 
described earlier by Blair and Hill, which is facilitated by the use of a visual. 
Something like emoticons, then, which combines the powerful rhetorical tools of 
gesture and image, is exceedingly capable of persuasion of allocating attention. 
That’s perhaps all the reason that the participants in this information economy 
are so increasingly keen to wildly deploy them. Incidentally, the upsurge of 
texting language that brought the question of this study to light is hardly singular 
to that problematic demographic of high-school and college-aged students 
dubbed the “Instant Message Generation.”  
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In 2004, PEW Internet and American Life Project conducted a study that 
suggested around 53 million American adults use IM—a 29% increase since 
2002 and, further, that 11 million used IM in the workplace reporting that it was a 
quicker, more efficient form of communication (Lenhart “How Americans”). 
Younger internet users use IM with more frequency and “more ardently,” and the 
majority say they multi-task, IMing while browsing the Web, talking on the phone, 
or conducting other daily business. The trend suggests these numbers will 
“eventually lead to an influx of corporate IMers” (Greenspan) and, where there is 
IM, there will be texting language.  
That texting language is a happy sign that web users are tuned-in to the 
discursive shifts caused by the Internet. Whether or not they know the reasons, it 
seems people are becoming increasingly aware of the need for gesture and 
visual rhetoric in creating speaker presence for online argument. Can emoticons 
enhance your scholarly article for peer-review? Probably not. However, as Gurak 
and Ong before her point out, literacy does not belong exclusively to academia or 
print text, but includes simply being able to communicate effectively in various 
environments where writing and oral speech are of equal import.  As the 
articulation of opinions online becomes more fragmented and their textual 
manifestations begin to move further from traditional concepts of “form,” in 
discursive arenas like the blogosphere, people will begin to transfer these habits 
to other writing environments. In light of that expansion, education—the 
institution to which society has turned over the centuries for literacy and life 
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skills—should take note of its role in the information economy and turn its 
attention to, well, attention.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The reason for the slow progress of the world seems to lie in a single fact. Every 
man is born under the yoke, and grows up beneath the oppression of his age. He 
can only get a vision of the unselfish forces in the world by appealing to them, 
and every appeal is a call to arms. If he fights he must fight, not one man, but a 
conspiracy. He is always at war with civilization. On his side is proverbial 
philosophy, a galaxy of saints and sages, and the half-developed consciousness 
of professions and everybody. Against him is the world, and every selfish passion 
in his own heart. 
 
       —John Jay Chapman 
 
 
Educators understandably have little reverence for the emoticons and 
texting language of the internet. Slowly but surely, handfuls of scholars are 
warming up to the infiltration of traditional composition studies by electronic 
communication. While writing for the electronic environment is being welcomed 
into the folds of many curricula, the novelties of online writing outside of the 
institution—like emoticons and texting language—continue to be barred from the 
classroom at all costs, with seemingly little investigation into why students are so 
keen to employ them. But educators have a responsibility to address the social 
and rhetorical implications of emoticons and the social contracts of electronic 
communication that inform their use.  
Electronic communication, as Ong tells us, is more immediate, more 
loosely-structured, and more conversational. Online writing contains elements of 
both print and oral literacy and embraces the natural chaos of writing, the 
“allatonceness” of composition. In that chaos, where attention is so easily 
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diverted and slowing down to assess information becomes more challenging, the 
need for critical evaluation of content becomes amplified. Cyberliteracy is a 
combination of oral and print literacy that attempts to respond to the demands of 
the electronic environment. Traditionally, society has looked toward academia to 
help meet those literacy demands, and this case should be no different.  
In combining orality and print, electronic communication reorders the 
rhetorical canons to put delivery at the front of the line, reviving the classical 
interest in gesture. Through most online interfaces where the physical body of 
the speaker and hearer are not visible, emoticons function as gesture, 
particularly facial expression. By their use in augmenting alphabetical language, 
emoticons draw visual meaning by reflecting, as Quintilian says is so important to 
delivery, the speaker’s thought. These “gestures” are unavoidably more 
intentional than many “real life” gestures and therefore make the person 
deploying them more accountable for them, necessitating that gesture-
proficiency be an aim of cyberliteracy.  
Language on the internet, like language everywhere else, is a social 
construct, an implicit social agreement that informs our online modus operandi. 
As a result, users will call on each other for guidance in composition and rhetoric. 
Whether they look to education or to the internet itself will depend largely on how 
willing educators are to address these new linguistic codes and elements. If the 
institution of education wants to have a valuable role in this growing business of 
online writing, it will have to reevaluate—as the millions of wired-in Americans 
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around them appear to have done already—the import of delivery and, 
specifically, gesture to rhetorical studies.  
Delivery—the canon that addresses how something is said—allows that 
gesture has a special capability for affecting human emotion. As a representation 
of gesture, an emoticon attends primarily to pathos, arguably the most powerful 
and immediate means of persuasion. Furthermore, the ability of emoticons to 
signify speaker presence makes them a powerful tool for establishing ethos. 
These elements of Computer Mediated Communication (CMC), along with much 
of the texting language of the Web, belong to the delivery that has been so 
terribly mistreated and neglected over the years, before finally being placed on 
the doorstep of communications studies in the early-mid twentieth century. In 
Composition and Rhetoric programs, delivery (which deals far more with oration 
than composition) ranks appallingly low on the departmental list of rhetorical 
priorities. Prior to the relative confinement of English studies to the examination 
of literature and production of print texts, orality was assumed to be an crucial 
component of rhetoric, as if not more important than writing. In its inception, 
rhetoric was essentially an art and study of public speaking and, in the public 
spaces of the Internet, people seem to be consistently rejecting Education’s 
impertinent treatment of rhetoric’s natural orality.  
This academic abandonment of delivery has been excused away by the 
demand for more reviewable educational assessments—written assessments—
and the social shift toward print literacy that accompanied it (Berlin, 182-83, Ong 
113, Reynolds 4). Today, however, those demands for print literacy are wholly 
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trumped by the second orality of CMC and the significance of delivery to effective 
communication. By not recognizing these centralities of online communication, 
academics devalue what millions of Americans hold dear, thus reducing their 
dependency on the academy and their inclination to seek guidance there. Put 
simply, people have grown restless under the fixed and increasingly immaterial 
literacy structures of English studies and are becoming less and less willing to 
allow the institution of education to exercise control over their social realities. The 
authority of educators will become more diminished with every day that passes, 
unless they readjust their instruction to meet these new needs of composition.   
For educators, the best practice in this regard may be to not only address 
the aspects of delivery that are resuscitated by electronic writing in the form of 
emoticons and texting language, but to use those elements as a pedagogical 
tool. The examples from Chapter 3 all provide some starting ground for 
assessments that would give students opportunities to demonstrate 
understanding of an engagement with a text or concept, and allow them to do it 
in their own language. Invariably, authentic assessment relies on the personal, 
real-world relevance of assignments that respond to students’ needs. For 
meaningful learning to occur, students must be allowed to bring their 
experiences, abilities, and loves into the learning process and today those 
experiences, abilities, and loves are located in the online writing that, despite all 
the academic groans, include emoticons and texting language.  
As demonstrated by the profundity of the emoticoncert and the innovation 
of the Rives poem, these kinds of compositions could be used to evaluate a 
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student’s understanding of a text without necessarily sidelining verbal proficiency 
or critical engagement.  Certainly new skill does not have to come at the expense 
of old skill. Even the acute attention to emotional appeal shown in “Pride and 
Prejudice in Emoticons” has value for classroom activities. By addressing the 
larger conceptual demands of online composition (attention to gesture and 
delivery) and their more local manifestations (emoticons and texting language), 
educators can provide an outlet for “text-speak” without overturning their 
mandate for linguistic excellence. That kind of attention doesn’t just improve 
quality of education by legitimizing student abilities, but by taking an active role in 
preparing students for survival in the information economy.  
In the information economy the most marketable skills are attention-
control and critical evaluation of content. In the world of Internet communication, 
information is overabundant to the point of distraction, and the valuable 
commodity is the human attention needed to parse that information. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, commanding attention requires an ability to direct 
audience focus to the surface—to the symbols of the writing itself, rather than to 
the concepts beneath—so that the reader has permission to call on his own 
definitions and take an active rhetorical role in the formation of meaning. This is 
best accomplished, as Hill, Blair, and Lanham point out, through the use of 
images (images like emoticons) and, as Sauer and Kendon suggest, gesture (like 
the gesture represented by texting language). Once again, it seems the general 
public is one step ahead of academia in responding to the demands of online 
writing and, in this instance, to the requirements of the information economy.  
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A society’s survival is wholly dependent on its ability to adapt to economic 
circumstances and it is education that is responsible, in part, for fostering those 
adaptation skills in citizens. It could surely be argued that this separation 
occurring between the People and the institution is a happy thing. As an 
instructor pointed out, “this is a refreshing democratization…perhaps it’s good 
that academia is behind the curve on that one.” I would never claim to have a 
monopoly on the “truth” of that dependency. My argument, here, is certainly not 
say that English instruction should be the definitive voice in all matters linguistic, 
only that if educators want to enjoy participation in the formation of these new 
social contracts regarding composition and rhetoric, they’ll have to make 
adjustments to their pedagogy that account for those social changes. Despite all 
the academic hesitance to dive into the unfamiliar waters of electronic 
communication, the way that we interact with each other—particularly through 
composition—is changing and those institutions that wish to find themselves in a 
position of import and authority may well be better served by working toward 
progress, with the masses, rather than against it.  
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